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Scrip systems provide a non-monetary trade economy for exchange of resources. We model a scrip system as
a stochastic game and study system design issues on selection rules to match potential trade partners over
time. We show the optimality of one particular rule in terms of maximizing social welfare for a given scrip
system that guarantees players' incentives to participate. We also investigate the optimal number of scrips
to issue under this rule. In particular, if the time discount factor is close enough to 1, or trade benets one
partner much more than it costs the other, the maximum social welfare is always achieved no matter how
many scrips are in the system. When the benet of trade and time discount are not suciently large, on
the other hand, injecting more scrips in the system hurts most participants; as a result, there is an upper
bound on the number of scrips allowed in the system, above which some players may default. We show
that this upper bound increases with the discount factor as well as the ratio between the benet and cost
of service. Finally, we demonstrate similar properties for a dierent service provider selection rule that has
been analyzed in previous literature.
1. Introduction
Scrips are coupons that are used in place of currency to exchange goods and services; typically,
they cannot be exchanged for money, and therefore their sole use is for the good or service which
they are intended for. In this paper we study scrip systems, which are markets that use scrips
rather than money to exchange goods and services. Such markets are typically implemented when
the use of governmental currency is impractical or undesirable.
One example of a scrip system is that of the Capitol Hill babysitting co-op, introduced in
Sweeney and Sweeney (1977). A group of about 150 married couples with children who lived in the
Washington, D.C. area were tired of looking for and hiring babysitters to watch their children every
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time they wanted to enjoy a night out. These couples decided to join together to form a babysitting
co-op, or scrip system, to help alleviate this problem. Every couple in the co-op was given an initial
amount of coupons, or scrips. If a couple decided to enjoy a night out, they would oer a coupon to
another couple in the co-op in exchange for babysitting services. As long as another couple in the
co-op was willing to babysit in exchange for the coupon, the trade would occur. Since there was
a xed number of coupons in the system, in the long-run, each couple was guaranteed to babysit
and receive babysitting services the same number of times.
It turns out that this babysitting co-op experienced market crashes similar to many other types
of markets. Initially, they distributed too few coupons and found that very few coupons were being
exchanged for babysitting services. This was likely because either a couple ran out of coupons to
pay for service or they valued one coupon more than the enjoyment of a night out, resulting in the
couple hoarding the few coupons they had for later special situations. In order to solve this issue,
the group collectively decided to increase the number of coupons in the system by giving every
couple additional coupons. Unfortunately, the co-op experienced yet another market crash. This
time, each couple valued one additional coupon too little, resulting in no couples willing to provide
babysitting services to earn an additional coupon.
This story of the babysitting co-op was popularized by Krugman (1999), who related the scrip
system's crashes to economic slumps and monetary policies. Since both types of crashes occurred
due to having the wrong number of scrips in the system, a natural and important question to ask
is, therefore, what is the \right" number of scrips to have in a system?
There are many other examples of scrip systems that have been implemented in resource exchange
environments. One of the most prevalent uses of scrip systems is in online peer-to-peer systems
to prevent free-riding. The idea is similar to that of the babysitting co-op example, where in the
long-run, the number of times that participants can receive service equals the number of times they
must provide service, thus eliminating free-riding. Examples of these systems include KARMA
(Vishnumurthy et al. 2003), DCRC and CORC (Gupta et al. 2003), FILETELLER (Ioannidis et al.
2002), Dandelion (Sirivianos et al. 2007), Antfarm (Peterson and Sirer 2009), and others (e.g.,
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Aperjis and Johari 2006 and Belenkiy et al. 2007). In each of these cases, scrips are credited to
users that provide service (e.g., share les) and debited when users receive service (e.g., access
other's les).
Another common use of scrip systems is in online resource allocation; for example, resources in
a grid computing network are allocated to its users by employing scrip systems, such as the Egg
project (Brunelle et al. 2006). Research testbed resources are also often allocated to researchers
via scrip systems, such as the Mirage system (see, e.g., Chun et al. 2005 and AuYoung et al. 2007)
and the Bellagio system (AuYoung et al. 2007). The Mariposa system (Stonebraker et al. 1996) is
a scrip system for allocating queries for distributed database systems. In each of these cases, users
are given an initial amount of scrips and use these scrips, typically in conjunction with an auction
mechanism, to attain the resources they need.
Privacy-enhancing technologies, such as anonymity networks, provide another increasingly
important application area of scrip systems. These technologies require a volunteer network of
servers to route Internet trac in order to conceal the user's IP address. An example benet of
these networks is that they allow users to avoid price discrimination by concealing their location.
One challenge of implementing these technologies is that there has been a lack of incentives for
volunteers to provide service. A scrip system has been proposed and analyzed in recent work to
help alleviate this problem (Humbert et al. 2011).
In addition to online applications, scrip systems are used in other areas as well. For example, a
scrip system is implemented in Ithaca, New York, where over 900 participants in the city use scrips
(called \Ithaca Hours") to exchange goods and services within the community with the purpose
of keeping money local and strengthening the local economy (Ithaca Hours, Inc. 2005). Over the
last decade, Bello (2009) notes that several other cities in the United States have also created their
own local currency for the same reason. Other economies use scrips instead of money for their only
means of exchanging goods and services; typically these economies are relatively small and isolated
so that the use of governmental currency is impractical (Timberlake 1987).
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Clearly scrip systems are important in a variety of settings, yet there has been relatively little
work done to analyze their behavior. In all of these examples, the number of scrips injected into
the system is a determinant of system performance. As seen from the babysitting co-op example,
having too few or too many scrips in the system can cause market crashes. Another important
question arises in the online applications of scrip systems { how should the service provider be
chosen? In this paper, we analyze a class of scrip systems and provide insights regarding system
design: the way service providers should be selected as well as the optimal number of scrips that
should be used in the system.
We show the optimality of one particular service provider selection rule for a given scrip system
in terms of maximizing social welfare, i.e., total utility of all players in the system over time, while
making sure that players have the incentive to follow the rules of the scrip system. For scrip systems
where the time discount factor is close enough to 1, or trade benets one partner much more than
it costs the other, the maximum social welfare is always achieved no matter how many scrips are
in the system. As a result, system optimal performance can be achieved under individual incentive
constraints. When the benet of trade and time discount are not suciently large, on the other
hand, injecting more scrips in the system hurts most participants; in this case, there is an upper
bound on the number of scrips allowed in the system, above which some players may default. We
show that this upper bound increases with the discount factor as well as the ratio between the
benet and cost of service.
In the remainder of this section, we provide a literature review on the modeling and analysis
of scrip systems. The basics of our model, as well as the optimal centralized control policy, are
introduced in Section 2. We then study the stochastic game played in the absence of a central
planner in Section 3 and demonstrate that the central optimal solution can be achieved in the
game when the discount factor is suciently large. Section 4 investigates the impact of the number
of scrips in the system. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper with a summary of our results and
potential areas for future work.
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1.1. Literature Review
As mentioned before, in the computer science literature, several papers have been written regarding
the application of scrip systems and their implementation. There have been, however, only a few
papers that formally model and analyze scrip systems. Aperjis and Johari (2006) is one of the
earliest papers that study a peer-to-peer le sharing system as an exchange economy. They proposed
a static game where users decide uploading/downloading rates, and they study the market clearing
prices in equilibrium. The papers that are most closely related to ours are Friedman et al. (2006),
Kash et al. (2007), Kash et al. (2009a) and Kash et al. (2009b). In fact, this stream of papers
motivated our study.
Friedman et al. (2006) is one of the rst papers that analyzed players' strategies as well as
design characteristics of scrip systems in a stochastic setting. Their model considers a homogeneous
population of players in a scrip system with a nite number of scrips. Services are provided at a
xed price (in terms of the number of scrips) and incur a xed and identical utility gain (loss)
to each player receiving (providing) the service. They consider an innite time horizon game with
discounting. In each period, a player is chosen uniformly at random to request service, while all
other players have the option to volunteer as a service provider, one of whom is selected randomly.
Our model, described in Section 2, is similar to their model with one major departure. Instead
of having a player chosen randomly to provide service, we allow the system designer to choose
a service provider selection rule that all players agree upon beforehand; then we determine the
number of scrips that should be injected in the system accordingly. At the end of our analysis, we
return to their assumption of randomly selecting a service provider, and we show similar results
regarding the number of scrips that should be injected into such a scrip system.
A key assumption adopted in Friedman et al. (2006) is that each player chooses to volunteer to
provide service following a threshold strategy. That is, a player is willing to volunteer to provide
service only if his scrip stock is lower than a threshold number of scrips. The paper shows that
when the discount factor is close enough to one, there exists an -Nash Equilibrium in which each
player follows such a threshold strategy. One implication of the threshold strategy is that there
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exists a total threshold number of scrips in the system, above which no trade occurs and therefore
the system will experience a market crash. Our model, on the other hand, does not restrict players'
strategies to be of threshold type; rather, we show the existence of a total threshold number of
scrips as a result. Follow-on work in Kash et al. (2009b) shows that social welfare increases as the
number of scrips in the system increases up to this threshold of total scrips, after which the social
welfare drops to zero due to the market crash. Kash et al. (2009a), where the model is further
generalized to include multiple player types, characterizes each player's threshold that achieves the
optimal social welfare. In Kash et al. (2009b), the authors further analyze the impact of altruists
and hoarders in the scrip system.
Motivated by the application of scrip systems to privacy-enhancing technologies, Humbert et al.
(2011) analyzes scrip systems where each service request requires n providers to satisfy. This model
directly extends the model in Kash et al. (2007) to require n service providers instead of one. The
authors show similar results to those in Kash et al. (2007) including the existence of an -Nash
Equilibrium where all players act according to a threshold policy.
Finally, recent literature in economics also studies scrip systems, motivated by the babysitting
co-op, as the micro-foundation of monetary policy. Hens et al. (2007) provides an overview of this
line of work. There are quite a few dierences between their model and ours. The main dierence
is that they assume no cost to provide service, while we assume providing service incurs a negative
utility, and the ratio between the benet and cost of service plays an important role in our model.
Similar to Friedman et al. (2006), Hens et al. (2007) also focuses on the random service provider
selection rule, which is, one may argue, simple and realistic in many economic settings.
2. Basic Model Description
Consider an economy with a non-empty set N of players. Each player i 2N has ri scrips, where
we abuse notation to use N to represent the number of players as well. In each time period, one
player at random will be type 1 with probability 1=N , and all other players' types are 0. In any
given period, the type 1 player is able to obtain utility u if the player chosen as a service provider
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(one of the type 0 players) is willing to sacrice utility c < u in exchange for 1 scrip and if the type
1 player has a scrip and is willing to pay 1 scrip for service. Assume a time discount factor  for
the system.
Denote the \state" of the system to be s= (r; j), where r is the vector of scrip stocks (ri)i2N
and j is the type 1 player. Thus, the total number of scrips in the system is R =
P
i ri, which
does not change over time. \State space" S is the collection of all possible states s. We denote a
stationary policy  to map the state (r; j) into a probability distribution on the remaining players
other than j. The purpose of  is to select a service provider for any possible state s. Denote set
 to represent the set of admissible policies.
At this point it is worth introducing a particular service provider selection rule in , the \min-
imum scrip selection rule" , where in each round, the type 0 player with the least number of
scrips is selected as the service provider. If more than one type 0 player has the fewest scrips, one
player is chosen randomly from them with equal likelihood to be the service provider. Another
example of a selection rule in  is the \random scrip selection rule", a common selection rule
considered in previous literature, where a player is selected as the service provider uniformly at
random, independent of her scrip stock.
We rst demonstrate that the minimum scrip selection rule, , maximizes social welfare among
all policies in  in a central planner setting, where we assume that a hypothetical central planner
not only chooses the service provider, but also decides whether trade should occur.
2.1. Central Planner Setting
Now we consider a hypothetical central planner who tries to maximize the total social welfare over
an innite time horizon with discount factor  2 (0;1). In each period, given state (r; j), the central
planner decides whether trade should occur when player j has at least one scrip, and if so, chooses
a player i to be the service provider. Let ek be a vector in <N with every component equal to zero
except the kth component equal to one. J(r; j) is the system social welfare from state (r; j), and
J (r) =PNj0=1 J(r; j0) is the total system social welfare across all states with the same vector of
scrip stocks. The corresponding Bellman equation is:
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J(r; j) =

maxfmaxi 6=j(u  c)+ NJ (r+ ei  ej); NJ (r)g ; rj > 0

N
J (r) ; rj = 0 ; (1)
where J (r) =
NX
j0=1
J(r; j0) :
In the Bellman equation (1), the outer maximization decides whether to trade a scrip for service,
while the inner maximization selects the trading partner.
Equivalently, we can express the Bellman equation in terms of J as J = J , where
( J )(r) = (N  Nr)
N
J (r)+
X
j: rj1
max
n
(u  c)+ 
N
max
i:i 6=j
J (r+ ei  ej); 
N
J (r)
o
; (2)
in which Nr is the number of players with positive scrips in r.
Next we dene the following properties for a function J dened on simplex fr 2ZN+ :
P
i ri =Rg
and show that the optimal system social welfare function J  satises them, which further implies
that the minimum scrip selection rule is optimal in the central planner setting.
(C1) Symmetry: For any r and r0 with rk = r0k for all k except i; j, where ri = r
0
j and rj = r
0
i,
J (r) =J (r0) : (3)
(C2) Concavity: For any r(1) and r(2), and 2 [0;1],
J (r(1))+ (1 )J (r(2))J  r(1)+(1 )r(2) : (4)
(C3) Smoothness: For any scrip distribution r and player j with rj > 0,
J (r) max
i:i 6=j
J (r+ ei  ej) N

(u  c) : (5)
Furthermore, for a player i, denote set Ir to contain all players with at most ri scrips. If
X
j2Ir
rj  ri(jIrj   1)+1 ; (6)
then for any player j 2 Ir we have
J (r) J (r+ ei  ej) N

(u  c) : (7)
Author: Analyzing Scrip Systems
Article submitted to ; manuscript no. (Please, provide the manuscript number!) 9
Proposition 1. The solution J  to the Bellman equation J =  J satises conditions (C1),
(C2), and (C3).
The proof is based on showing that for any function J that satises these properties, so does  J .
The detailed proof is presented in the Appendix. Proposition 1 implies the following characteriza-
tion of the central planner's optimal policy.
Theorem 1. In the central planner setting, trade always occurs, and the minimum scrip selec-
tion rule  is optimal.
Proof: Condition (5) for J  suggests
(u  c)+ 
N
max
m:m 6=l
J (r+ em  el) 
N
J (r) ;
for rl > 0, which implies that trade always occurs if the type 1 player has at least one scrip to pay
for service. Therefore, for a vector r with rj > 0, Bellman equation (1) becomes
J(r; j) = (u  c)+ 
N
max
i:i6=j
J (r+ ei  ej) : (8)
Denote d= ei ei0 . The concavity property (4) implies that J (r+d) is a concave function of .
Furthermore, symmetry (3) implies that J  r+(ri0 ri)d=J (r). Therefore, J (r+d)J (r)
for any 2 (0; ri0   ri). In particular, when ri0   ri  2, we have J (r+ d)J (r).
Consider vector r with ri < ri0 , and j 6= i; i0. Denote r = r+ ei0   ej. Therefore ri +2 ri0 . The
discussion above implies that J (r+d)J (r), or, J (r+ ei  ej)J (r+ ei0   ej). That is, the
optimal i that solves the maximization in (8) must be the one with the least number of scrips.
Q.E.D.
The intuition behind Theorem 1 is clear. In order to maximize social welfare, the central planner
always prefers trading, which generates u  c > 0, over not, whenever possible. Trade cannot occur
when the type 1 player has no scrips. The minimum scrip selection rule tries to balance the scrip
holdings among players, therefore minimizing the chance that a player runs out of scrips. An
important observation is that with more scrips in the system, there is a lower probability that a
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type 1 player will have no scrips, thus resulting in a higher probability of social welfare increasing
by u c in each round; this implies that in the central planner setting, social welfare increases with
the number of scrips in the system.
3. Stochastic Game and Optimality of Minimum Scrip Selection Rule
In this section, we remove the existence of a central planner, and we formally dene the game in
which the pair of players selected to be potential trade partners can decide whether to exchange a
scrip for service. We then demonstrate that even in the absence of a central planner, the minimum
scrip selection rule, , achieves the maximum social welfare obtained in the central planner setting
under certain conditions, which corresponds to the Folk Theorem for stochastic games (see, e.g.,
Fudenberg and Tirole 1991). Furthermore, we show that in the game setting there exist thresholds
on the discount factor as well as the relative benet of receiving a service above which all players
have the incentive to trade a scrip for service whenever the type 1 player has at least one scrip.
3.1. Stochastic Game
Now we consider a game in which all players meet beforehand and agree to follow a particular
service provider selection policy  2; we assume that no players collude. We focus on a stochastic
game setting where the planning horizon is innite, due to the well known distinction between nite
horizon stochastic games and innite horizon stochastic games (see, e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole
1991). In our setting, if the planning horizon was nite, given that scrips have no salvage value at
the end of the horizon, no type 0 player would oer service and suer a negative utility  c in the
last period. Using backward induction and following the same logic throughout the time horizon,
no trade ever occurs in any nite horizon game.
In the innite horizon setting, each player's strategy may depend on the entire history of the
game. In particular, we denote vector = (r; j; i;
) to represent the \state of game", in which r is
the scrip distribution vector, j is the type 1 player, i is the player selected to be the service provider
according to selection rule (r; j), and set 
 contains all players who have never refused to trade
scrip for service with anyone within set 
 at the time they were called upon to serve. Obviously,
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in the beginning of the time horizon, 
 contains all the N players in the game. Further denote set
Dk() to represent player k 2N 's action space at state of game . In particular, if player j has
positive scrips (rj > 0), she can choose whether or not to give one scrip to player i in exchange
for service (dj = 1), or not to spend the scrip for service (dj = 0); therefore, Dj(r; j; i;
) = f1;0g.
Player i, on the other hand, can choose whether to accept the scrip and serve player j (di = 1) or
not (di = 0); therefore, Di(r; j; i;
) = f1;0g. Any player other than i and j must take no action,
so Dk(r; j; i;
) = f0g for k 6= i; j. Note that at state of game  = (r; j; i;
), trade of a scrip for
service occurs only if rjdidj > 0. Denote the action prole D() =k2NDk(), with element d() =
(dk())k2N 2D().
Given state of game  = (r; j; i;
) and action prole d, single period utilities for players i and
j depend on whether or not trade occurred; ui(; d) =  c and uj(; d) = u if rjdidj > 0 (trade
occurred), and ui(; d) = uj(; d) = 0 if rjdidj = 0 (trade did not occur). In either case, for any
player k 6= i; j, the utility uk(; d) = 0. Given service provider selection rule , each player tries to
maximize her own total utility over an innite horizon with discount factor  2 (0;1).
Following Myerson (1997), it is sucient to consider stationary strategy proles. Specically,
consider stationary strategy k for player k that maps state of the game  to a particular action
dk 2Dk() and the corresponding policy prole for all players, denoted as  = (k). Let vk(; )
denote player k's expected -discounted average payo if players commit to stationary policy
prole  and the current state of game is . Further denote Yk(; dk; vk; ) to represent player k's
discounted average payo starting from state  if all players commit to stationary policy  except
player k, who deviates in the rst round with action dk,
Yk(; dk; vk; ) = (1  )uk
 
; (dk;  k())

+

N
X
j02N
vk

;
 
r0; j0; (r0; j0); !(; dk)

;
where !(; dk) =
 if dk = 1 or k 6= i; j ; and
!(; dk) =
 n k if dk = 0 and k= i or j :
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Theorem 7.1 of Myerson (1997) states that the stationary strategy  is an equilibrium strategy
prole of the stochastic game if for every player k we have
vk(; ) = max
dk2Dk()
Yk(; dk; vk; ) : (9)
In other words, if each player's optimal strategy is to not deviate from  in a single period, then 
is an equilibrium strategy prole. Using these notations, it is straightforward to verify the following
result.
Lemma 1. Following any service provider selection agreement  2 , it is an equilibrium for
every player i= (r; j) to always refuse providing service. The corresponding equilibrium discounted
average payo for each player is 0.
In order to demonstrate the next result, we dene the always trade strategy prole  to be such
that in each time period the type 1 player always chooses to pay for service whenever she has
positive scrips, and the selected type 0 player always chooses to provide service as long as the type
1 player belongs to set 
 and refuses to provide service if the type 1 player does not belong to set

. We also dene unichain selection rules to be the set of service provider selection rules under
which if players follow the always trade strategy prole, the resulting Markov chain on the state
space S is unichain. It is easy to verify that both the minimum and random scrip selection rules
mentioned earlier in the paper are examples of unichain selection rules, along with many others.
Lemma 2. Following any unichain service provider selection rule , if players follow the always
trade strategy  , the total discounted payo is positive for all players at any state s for  close
enough to 1.
Proof: Since policy  is unichain, the long run average payo is independent of the initial state
(r; j) (Bertsekas 2007). In any time period, the chance that a random service requester has a
positive number of scrips is at least 1=N . As a result, by following the always trade strategy prole,
the expected social welfare gain per time period is at least (u  c)=N , which lower bounds the long
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run average social welfare gain. Since the N players are indistinguishable, the per player long run
average payo is lower bounded by (u  c)=N2 > 0.
Following Proposition 4.1.2 of Bertsekas (2007), the total average discounted payo vk( ; )
converges to the long run average payo as discount  approaches 1, and therefore is also positive.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 2 essentially states that when the discount factor is close enough to 1, the value function
is positive at all states under any unichain service provider selection rule and the always trade
strategy. Following the idea behind the Folk Theorem, if a player wants to refuse requesting or
providing service in exchange for a scrip, and therefore deviate from the always trade strategy, the
entire group of players can punish this player by refusing to provide service in the future. This
results in an inferior, zero, total future utility for the focal player. This threat prevents a player
from deviating from the always trade strategy. The following result summarizes this idea.
Lemma 3. Under any unichain service provider selection rule , there exists a  such that for
any  2 [;1], the always trade strategy prole  is an equilibrium.
This result follows from the Folk Theorem for stochastic games (Theorem 9, Dutta (1995)). The
complete proof in the Appendix veries the conditions of Theorem 9 in Dutta (1995) based on
Lemmas 1 and 2.
Lemma 3 implies that as the discount factor is getting close to 1, the centralized optimal solution
can be achieved in the stochastic game. This is by no means surprising, in light of the Folk Theorem.
The above sequence of lemmas, however, motivates our next analysis of the always trade strategy
when either the policy  is not unichain or the discount factor is not suciently close to 1; these
are cases where we can not invoke the Folk Theorem.
3.2. Always Trade Strategy
In this section we show that under certain conditions the central planner's optimal social welfare
obtained in Section 2.1 can be achieved in the stochastic game. Motivated by Lemmas 1 - 3, we
next focus on the case in which each player follows the always trade strategy.
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Without loss of generality, denote V (s) to represent the total discounted value function of player
1 at state of the system s = (r; j), under service provider selection rule  and the always trade
strategy  . Therefore, function V satises the following recursive equation,
V = TV ; (10)
in which
(TV )(r;1) =

(=N)
P
j0 V (r; j
0) ; r1 = 0
u+ =(N j(r;1)j)Pj0Pi2(r;1) V (r  e1+ ei; j0) ; r1 > 0 ; (11)
and
(TV )(r; j) =
8><>:
(=N)
P
j0 V (r; j
0) ; rj = 0
=(N j(r; j)j)Pj0Pi2(r;j) V (r  ej + ei; j0) ; rj > 0; 1 62(r; j)
 c+ =NPj0Pi2(r;j) V (r  ej + ei; j0)=j(r; j)j ; rj > 0; 12(r; j) :
(12)
Here the set (r; j) represents the set of players eligible to be selected as the service provider,
according to selection policy ; we assume ties are broken randomly. For example, under the
minimum scrip selection rule , set (r;1) includes all players who hold the smallest number of
scrips, excluding player 1. If the cardinality of the set j(r; j)j> 1, each player in the set has the
same chance of being chosen to be the service provider. When the service provider selection rule
is clear in the context, we remove the superscript in  for simplicity.
Using the recursive expression of value function V , we show the following result.
Proposition 2. For any given service provider selection rule  2  and model parameters u,
c, N and R, there is a unique threshold  2 (0;1), such that V (r; j) 0 for all r and j if and only
if   .
Proof: Denote V  to be the solution to recursive equations (10)-(12). That is, V  = TV  . Now
consider a slightly revised value iteration,
(T V )(r;1) =

(=N)
P
j0 V (r; j
0) ; r1 = 0
u+ =(N j(r;1)j)Pj0Pi2(r;1) V (r  e1+ ei; j0) ; r1 > 0 ;
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(T V )(r; j) =
8><>:
(=N)
P
j0 V (r; j
0) ; rj = 0
=(N j(r; j)j)Pj0Pi2(r;j) V (r  ej + ei; j0) ; rj > 0; 1 62(r; j)
 c+ =NPj0Pi2(r;j) V (r  ej + ei; j0)=j(r; j)j ; rj > 0; 12(r; j) :
Denote V^  to be the solution to V^  = T V^  , which is also the total discounted value function of
player 1 with u and c as the benet and cost of trade instead of u and c. Therefore, V^  = V  .
Now consider a discount factor ^ such that V ^  0, which implies V^ ^  0. Consider any discount
factor 0 such that 0 > ^. We have T 
0
V^ ^  T ^V^ ^ = V^ ^  0. Following the convergence of the
value iteration algorithm and monotonicity of the operator T  (Corollary 1.2.1.1 and Lemma 1.1.1
in Bertsekas (2007)),
V^ 
0
= lim
t!1
(T 
0
)tV^ ^  lim
t!1
(T ^)tV^ ^ = V^ ^  0 ;
which implies V 
0
= V^ 
0
=0  0. Q.E.D.
Note that this result is stronger than Lemma 2 because it holds for policies  that are not
unichain and shows a unique threshold . Parallel to Proposition 2, we have the following intuitive
result.
Proposition 3. For any given service provider selection rule  2  and model parameters ,
N and R, there is a unique threshold on u=c, such that V (r; j) 0 for all r and j if and only if
u=c is larger than this threshold.
The proof is very similar to the proof of Proposition 2 and thus is omitted here.
Propositions 1, 2 and 3 imply the following main result of this section, which is stronger than
Lemma 3.
Theorem 2. For any model parameters u, c, N and R, there is a unique threshold of the discount
factor, , such that when  > , the centralized optimal social welfare is achieved in equilibrium.
That is, all players agree upon the minimum scrip selection rule  and follow the always trade
strategy in equilibrium.
Similarly, for any given model parameters , N and R, there is a unique threshold on u=c, above
which the centralized optimal social welfare is achieved in equilibrium by all players agreeing upon
the minimum scrip selection rule and following the always trade strategy.
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The equilibrium result is proved by applying the denition of the always trade strategy to equilib-
rium condition (9).
4. Number of Scrips in the System
In the previous section we demonstrated the optimality of the minimum scrip selection rule in the
stochastic game setting with a xed number of scrips and when the discount factor is large enough.
In this section we investigate the appropriate number of scrips to ensure that always trade is an
equilibrium strategy under the minimum scrip selection rule. In particular, we show that under
fairly general conditions, there is a unique threshold of the number of scrips in the system, below
which always trade is an equilibrium. Furthermore, the threshold increases with the discount factor
 and the benet of receiving service, u=c.
First we present a condition under which no matter how many scrips are in the system, the value
function for any state is non-negative, implying that always trade is an equilibrium.
Theorem 3. Under any service provider selection rule  2, if
u
c
 N

; (13)
no matter how many scrips are in the system, the value function V that solves the recursive equa-
tions (10)-(12) is non-negative; that is, the always trade strategy is an equilibrium.
The proof is presented in the Appendix.
The condition (13), rewritten as c  u=N , reects the trade-o between the cost of serving
today versus the expected benet of receiving service tomorrow. It is intuitive that if the cost of
earning a scrip today is less than the expected benet of spending it in the next period, providing
service never generates a negative net expected prot. Interestingly, the condition does not depend
on the service provider selection rule.
Since the condition is rather restrictive, we next analyze what happens under the minimum scrip
selection rule when the condition c u=N is violated. First, we present a technical characterization
of recurrent states, which is somewhat interesting in its own right and useful for proving our main
result.
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Lemma 4. Consider the case when R N , i.e., the number of scrips in the system is no less
than the number of players. Under the minimum scrip selection rule and always trade strategy,
any state with more than one player having 0 scrips is transient.
The proof is based on induction on the number of players with 0 scrips. The detailed proof is
presented in the Appendix. Lemma 4 allows us to restrict attention to only those states where
no more than 1 player has 0 scrips, which will be useful to prove Proposition 4, constituting the
foundation of our main result, Theorem 4.
Analogous to the symmetry condition (C1) in the central planner setting, Lemma 5 below pro-
vides a symmetry argument needed for the proofs of Propositions 4 and 5.
Lemma 5. Assume value function V satises recursive equations (10)-(12) for a system with
RN scrips with the minimum scrip selection rule. For any nonnegative integer vectors r and r0
such that
P
j rj =R and
P
j r
0
j =R with rk = r
0
k for all k except l 6= 1, m 6= 1, where rl = r0m and
rm = r
0
l, X
j
V (r; j) =
X
j
V (r0; j) : (14)
The proof is presented in the Appendix.
Proposition 4. Assume value function V satises recursive equations (10)-(12) for a system
with RN scrips with the minimum scrip selection rule, and value function V satises recursive
equations (10)-(12) for a system with the same parameters except with R + 1 scrips. Further,
assume that
u
c
 N


N

  (N   1)

  (N   1) : (15)
For any nonnegative integer vector r in the recurrent class such that
P
j rj = R, and any player
index j and k 6= 1, we have
V (r+ ek; j) V (r; j) ; (16)X
j
V (r+ e1; j) 
X
j
V (r; j) cN

; 8r : r1 > 0 ; and (17)
X
j
V (r+ e1; j) 
X
j
V (r; j) N


N

  (N   1)

c ; 8r : r1 = 0 : (18)
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Property (16) is a monotonicity property for value functions across dierent state spaces, and it
states that if we inject one more scrip in the system, every player, other than the one who receives
the scrip, is worse o (measured by the value function). For the one who does receive the additional
scrip, while it is intuitive that the person is better o, properties (17) and (18) show that the
benet is, in fact, upper bounded. The basic proof logic for Proposition 4 is that those properties
are preserved through value iteration. The complete proof, however, needs to verify the properties
under all possible scenarios of scrip distribution among players in both the R scrip system as well
as the R+1 scrip system. Furthermore, in order to establish each one of properties (16)-(18), we
need all the other properties as well as condition (15). As a result, the proof is rather involved and
is presented in the Appendix.
Property (16) is the key property that we focus on. It implies that there is a threshold (possibly
innity) on the number of scrips, above which the value function at some state may become
negative. When the value function does become negative, the threat of zero utility does not work
anymore, and the corresponding player at this state is better o claiming bankruptcy by leaving
the group. In order to prevent such an undesirable outcome, the number of scrips issued in the
system must be lower than this threshold.1 As discussed in Section 2.1, the social welfare of the
system increases with the number of scrips. Therefore, assuming players follow the minimum scrip
selection rule, the system designer will choose the number of scrips in the system to be just below
this threshold in order to achieve the greatest possible social welfare while making it in each player's
best interest to not leave the group.
It is important to note that there is a possibility that a dierent service provider selection rule
may permit a greater number of scrips than the minimum scrip selection rule. We have shown
that for a given number of scrips in the system, the minimum scrip selection rule achieves the
maximum social welfare. It could be possible, however, that a dierent service provider selection
rule outperforms the minimum scrip selection rule because it allows more scrips in the system
without a player defaulting compared to the minimum scrip selection rule. In Section 4.2 we analyze
Author: Analyzing Scrip Systems
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Figure 1 Conditions (13) and (15), with N = 5.
the optimal number of scrips to issue under the random scrip selection rule, a common selection
rule considered in previous literature.
The monotonicity property (16), however, holds only under condition (15). Figure 1 depicts the
condition. That is, in the area below the solid curve, due to monotonicity there is a threshold on
the number of scrips (possibly innity), below which always trade is an equilibrium strategy. The
dashed curve in Figure 1 corresponds to condition (13) in Theorem 3. In the area above the dashed
curve, no matter how many scrips are in the system, always trade is an equilibrium strategy. These
curves partition Figure 1 into four ares. In area A, no matter how many scrips are in the system,
always trade is an equilibrium strategy. In area B, adding a scrip to the system decreases every
player's total discounted value except that of the player with the additional scrip; however, we
know that each player's total discounted value remains positive and thus no matter how many
scrips are in the system, always trade is an equilibrium. In area C, adding a scrip to the system
decreases every player's total discounted value except that of the player with the additional scrip;
in this case, there is a threshold (possibly innity) on the number of scrips above which at least
one of the player's total discounted value is negative. This leaves the shaded area depicted in the
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gure not covered by theoretical results. Later in Section 4.1, we conduct a numerical study on
the shaded area, which indicates that although the monotonicity property (16) does not hold, it is
very likely that there still exists a unique upper bound on the number of scrips.
Theorem 2 in the previous section, combined with the upper threshold on the number of scrips
implied by Proposition 4, gives the following main result of the paper.
Theorem 4. In a scrip system with N players and at least N scrips, for any given set of model
parameters such that
u
c
 2(N   1)p
N 2+4N   4 N ; or  
N(
p
N 2+4N   4 N)
2(N   1) ; (19)
there is an upper bound R (possibly innity) on the number of scrips, below which always trade
is an equilibrium strategy under the minimum scrip selection rule, and the system optimal social
welfare is achieved in the game. Furthermore, the upper threshold R increases with  and u=c.
Sucient condition (19) covers the area to the left and above of the intersection between the
solid and dashed curves in Figure 1. As we will demonstrate in numerical studies in Section 4.1, the
monotone threshold structure presented in Theorem 4 likely holds even without these conditions
being met.
4.1. Shaded Area
We do not have theoretical results when conditions (13) and (15) are both violated, depicted by
the shaded area in Figure 1. Therefore, we conducted numerical studies to check the structure of
the value function in its minimum recurrent state. In particular, we take a grid of values for u=c
and  in the shaded area when N = 3,2 and we see how the minimum value function value (over
recurrent states) changes with increasing R. We observe that in every case, the value function is
unimodal and therefore monotonically decreases as R increases to be large enough. Figure 2 depicts
one such example.
The ndings indicate that when condition (15) in Proposition 4 is violated, a player's value
function does not always decrease monotonically with more scrips given to others. On the other
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Figure 2 The non-monotone, unimodal structure of the value function in its minimum recurrent state.
hand, in our numerical examples, it always rst increases when the number of scrips R is small, and
then decreases. Therefore, as long as the minimum value function over recurrent states is positive
at the smallest scrip number R=N , there still is a unique upper bound (possibly innity) on the
number of scrips, below which the value function is positive in all states. If so, the threshold on the
number of scrips in the system increases with  and u=c, even without the necessity of condition
(19).
The following result indicates that when R = N the value function is indeed positive in all
recurrent states.
Proposition 5. Assume R=N and
u
c
 N


N

  (N   1)

  (N   1) : (20)
The value function V that solves the recursive equations (10)-(12) under the minimum scrip selec-
tion rule is positive in all recurrent states.
The proof is included in the Appendix.
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4.2. Random Scrip Selection Rule
As mentioned above, there is a possibility that a dierent service provider selection rule may
permit a greater number of scrips than the minimum scrip selection rule. We showed that for a
given number of scrips in the system, the minimum scrip selection rule achieves the maximum
social welfare, but it could be possible that with more scrips in the system, a dierent service
provider selection rule still guarantees that no player will default, and therefore may outperform
the minimum scrip selection rule at its threshold of fewer scrips. Here we analyze the optimal
number of scrips to issue under the random scrip selection rule, a common selection rule considered
in previous literature.
For a scrip system following the random scrip selection rule, where a player is selected as the
service provider uniformly at random, the function V satises the following recursive equation,
V = TV ; (21)
in which
(TV )(r;1) =
 
N
P
j0 V (r; j
0) ; r1 = 0
u+ 
N(N 1)
P
j0
P
i 6=1 V (r  e1+ ei; j0) ; r1 > 0 ; (22)
and
(TV )(r; j) =
 
N
P
j0 V (r; j
0) ; rj = 0
 c
N 1 +

N(N 1)
P
j0
P
i6=j V (r  ej + ei; j0) ; rj > 0 : (23)
Similar to Proposition 4 for the minimum scrip selection rule, the following result holds for the
random scrip selection rule.
Proposition 6. Assume value function V satises recursive equations (21)-(23) for a scrip
system with the random scrip selection rule, and value function V satises recursive equations
(21)-(23) for a system with the same parameters except with R+1 scrips. Further, assume that
u
c
 N

  (N   1) : (24)
For any nonnegative integer vector r such that
P
j rj = R and any player index j and k 6= 1, we
have
V (r+ ek; j) V (r; j) ; and (25)
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X
j
V (r+ e1; j) 
X
j
V (r; j) cN

: (26)
Property (25) is a monotonicity property for value functions across dierent state spaces, and states
that if we inject one more scrip in the system, every player, other than the one who receives the
scrip, is worse o (measured by the value function). For the one who does receive the additional
scrip, while it is intuitive that the person is better o, property (26) states that the benet is, in
fact, upper bounded. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 4 and is presented in the Appendix.
For similar reasons as discussed above for the minimum scrip selection rule, property (25) implies
that there is a threshold (possibly innity) on the number of scrips in the system, above which the
value function at some state may become negative. Numerical studies similar to those described in
Section 4.1 suggest that conditions (13) and (24) are sucient, but not necessary, for the threshold
structure to hold.
Interestingly, therefore, both the minimum scrip selection rule and the random scrip selection
rule permit a threshold number of scrips in the system (possibly innity), above which the system
crashes. Depending upon the system parameters u, c, N , and , numerical results show that
sometimes the minimum scrip selection rule permits at least as many scrips as the random scrip
selection rule; in this case, the minimum scrip selection rule is the preferable service provider
selection rule for the scrip system because it provides a greater social welfare. For other parameters,
though, the random scrip selection rule permits more scrips than the minimum scrip selection rule,
and in some cases the dierence is enough to cause the random scrip selection rule to outperform
the minimum scrip selection rule in terms of social welfare. Depending on the system parameters
and application, the system designer may choose to compare the performance of the minimum
scrip selection rule and the random scrip selection rule before creating the scrip system. Since both
exhibit a threshold property on the number of permissable scrips in the system, this should be
relatively simple to do.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we study design issues for managing a scrip system in a stochastic setting. In partic-
ular, in each period one player becomes a service requester and receives positive utility if another
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player is willing to provide the service in exchange for a scrip. We rst show that a central planner
would always prefer a trade of scrip for service to occur and would select the player who has the
least number of scrips to be the service provider.
In a stochastic game setting with the absence of a central planner, such a system optimal solution
can be achieved in equilibrium when the time discount factor is high enough or when the benet
of service is high enough compared with the cost to the service provider. When the time discount
factor, or ratio between the benet and cost of service, is not that high, we show that when using
the minimum scrip selection rule or random scrip selection rule there is an upper bound on the
number of scrips that are allowed in the system, above which some players may decide to default
and exit the game when their scrip stock becomes low. Furthermore, this upper bound increases
with the time discount factor as well as the ratio between the benet and cost of service.
From a system design point of view, our results demonstrate that, assuming players follow the
minimum scrip selection rule, the number of scrips in the system should be at the upper bound,
and all players have the incentive to trade scrip for service whenever the service requester has at
least one scrip. We also analyzed a commonly used service provider selection rule, the random scrip
selection rule, and showed similar threshold results as the minimum scrip selection rule. This makes
it simple for the system designer to compare the performance of the minimum scrip selection rule
and the random scrip selection rule and choose the rule that results in the greatest social welfare.
There are a number of possible extensions to our paper that deserve further exploration. The
most notable one is that preferences are not homogeneous among players. For example, some
players may value the service more than others, or providing service may cost some players more
than others. Similarly, the benet and cost of service may change over time or be stochastic. We
suspect that the reason why our system does not experience a market crash when there are too few
scrips, as observed in some applications, is a result of our current assumptions on the homogeneity
of utilities across players and over time. Future work will hopefully provide us with more insights
on this type of market crash. Another extension that is worth studying is that the price of service
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may not be xed at one scrip, but is instead determined according to the scrip distribution among
players.
Endnotes
1. When too many scrips are issued and a player i's scrip stock is running low, other players may
refuse to provide service to player i in exchange for a scrip, in order to avoid player i's bankruptcy.
We do not study such complex strategic plays. Instead, from a system design point of view, our
results justify simply upper bounding the number of scrips in the system to guarantee that trade
always occurs.
2. Since the state space grows exponentially with N , which poses signicant computational chal-
lenges, we did not check for higher values of N .
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
In this proof we show that starting from a function J that satises conditions (C1), (C2) and (C3),  J
also satises them. First note that function J0 = 0 for all r (obtained from J0 = 0 for all (r; j)) satises all
these conditions.
Condition (5) for J implies
(u  c)+ 
N
max
m:m 6=l
J (r+ em  el) 
N
J (r) ;
which further implies
( J )(r) =Nr(u  c)+ 
N
"
(N  Nr)J (r)+
X
l:rl1
max
m:m6=l
J (r+ em  el)
#
: (27)
More generally, we re-write the above Bellman equation as
( J )(r) =Nr(u  c)+ 
N
"
(N  Nr)J (r)+
X
l:rl1
max
2l
J

r+
X
m
mem  el
#
; (28)
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where set l = f : l = 0; m  08m 6= l;
P
m
m = 1g. The formulation allows the service can be provided
and paid for in fractions. We will show later that when r is integer, such a generalization does not change
anything { the optimal selection  still guarantees that one particular player may be selected.
1. Condition (C1)
We rst show that condition (3) holds for  J in (28). That is, ( J )(r) = ( J )(r0). Note that
( J )(r0) =Nr0(u  c)+ 
N
24(N  Nr0)J (r0)+ X
l:r0
l
1
max
2l
J

r0+
X
m
mem  el
35 :
Obviously, Nr =Nr0 , and J (r) =J (r0) due to (3). Considering the following cases.
 l 6= i; j. For m 6= i; j, we have J (r+ em  el) = J (r0+ em  el) since (r+ em  el)i = (r0+ em  el)j and
(r+ em   el)j = (r0 + em   el)i. Furthermore, we have J (r+ ei   el) = J (r0 + ej   el) and J (r+ ej   el) =
J (r0+ ei  el). Therefore, max2l J (r+
P
m
mem  el) =max2l J (r0+
P
m
mem  el).
 ri  1 and l= i. For m 6= j, we have J (r+ em  ei) =J (r0+ em  ej). Furthermore, we have J (r+ ej  
ei) =J (r0+ ei  ej). Therefore, max2l J (r+
P
m
mem  el) =max2l J (r0+
P
m
mem  el).
 rj  1 and l = j. The same logic as in the previous case reveals max2l J (r +
P
m
mem   el) =
max2l J (r0+
P
m
mem  el).
Overall, we must have
P
l:rl1max2l J

r +
P
m
mem   el

=
P
l:r0
l
1max2l J

r0 +
P
m
mem   el

,
which implies the result.
2. Condition (C2)
We assume (4) holds for J (r) and show that it must also hold for ( J )(r). First, we show the following
lemma.
Lemma 6. Assume r
(1)
l  1 and r(2)l  1.
max
2l
J  r(1)+X
m
mem el

+(1 )max
2l
J  r(2)+X
m
mem el
max
2l
J  r(1)+(1 )r(2)+X
m
mem el

:
Proof: Denote 1, 2 and  to represent the optimal indices for the three maximization problems in the
inequality. We have
J

r(1)+(1 )r(2)+
X
m
mem  el

J

r(1)+(1 )r(2)+
X
m
 
1m+(1 )2m

em  el

 J

r(1)+
X
m
1mem  el

+(1 )J

r(2)+
X
m
2mem  el

;
where the rst inequality follows optimality of , and the second one follows concavity. Q.E.D.
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The right hand side of equation (28) is the summation of concave functions, which is still concave.
Now we argue that the generalization in (28) to allow non-degenerate  does not increase J for integer
vector r. Consider any vector r with ri > rj . Denote d= ej   ei. Symmetry (3) implies J (r+ (ri   rj)d) =
J (r). Further, concavity (4) implies that J (r+d) is concave in , and therefore J (r+d)J (r) for any
2 [0; ri  rj ].
Now assume integer vector r with rj being the smallest component in r except possibly rl, and ri  rj+1.
Consider two vectors  and ^ such that they are the same, except in two components: i > 0, ^i = 0, and
^j = i+ j . Denote r= r+
P
m
mem  el, and r^= r+
P
m
^mem  el. Since ri  rj +1, we have ri  rj , and
ri  rj  1+ i  j , and therefore i 2 [0; ri  rj ]. Together with r^= r+ id, we have J (r^)J (r). Following
the same logic for any ri > rj , we obtain that the value of max2l J (r+
P
m mem  el) is achieved when 
is zero in all components except smallest in r. If there is more than one smallest component in r, symmetry
further implies that we can select one of them for a degenerate . As a result, max2l J (r+
P
m
mem el) =
maxm:m 6=lJ (r+ em  el).
3. Condition (C3)
First, we show condition (5). From the previous proof, we know that for J satisfying (C1) and (C2), when
rj > ri, we have J (r)  J (r + ei   ej), which implies the condition automatically. Therefore we focus on
cases when ri  rj . Furthermore, player i must be the minimum scrip holder in r except j.
Denote ml to represent the player that achieves maxm:m 6=lJ (r+ em  el).
 rj  2. In this case Nr =Nr+ei ej =N . Therefore,
( J )(r)  ( J )(r+ ei  ej) = 
N
X
l

max
m:m6=l
J (r+ em  el)  max
m:m6=l
J (r+ ei  ej + em  el)

 
N
X
l

J (r+ em
l
  el) J
 
(r+ em
l
  el)+ ei  ej

| jIrj= 2. This means that Ir = fi; jg and i is the unique minimum scrip holder in r except j. Thus for
each possible value of l, i is also the minimum scrip holder in r+em
l
 el; note that if ri = rj and l= k 6= i; j,
then by (C1) we have J (r+ ei  ek) =J (r+ ej  ek) and we can choose mk = j to make this statement true.
Therefore, condition (5) implies the following result:
( J )(r)  ( J )(r+ ei  ej) 
N

N
N

(u  c)

<
N

(u  c) :
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| jIrj> 2. This means that player i is not a unique minimum scrip holder in r except j; in other words,
another player(s) has ri scrips. For l= j, we know from (C1) that J (r+ em
j
  ej) = J (r+ ek   ej) for any
player k 6= i with rk = ri. Thus, i is a minimum scrip holder in r+ ek  ej and we can apply condition (5).
For l = i, i is the minimum scrip holder in r+ ej   ei except j, so again we can apply condition (5). For
l= k 6= i; j with rk > ri, i is the minimum scrip holder in r+ej ek except j, so again we can apply condition
(5).
Finally, for l = k 6= i; j with rk = ri, i is no longer a minimum scrip holder in r + ej   ek. In this case,
if ri = rj , we know from (C1) that J (r+ em
k
  ek) = J (r+ ej   ek) and by choosing mk = j, we see that
(r+ ej   ek)i < (r+ ej   ek)j and from (C1) and (C2) we have J (r+ ej   ek)J (r+ ej   ek + ei  ej). On
the other hand, if ri > rj , we have jIr+ej ek j  3 and includes i; j; and k; since (r+ ej   ek)j  2 we know
condition (6) holds so we can apply condition (7). Putting all these cases together, we again have
( J )(r)  ( J )(r+ ei  ej) 
N

N
N

(u  c)

<
N

(u  c) :
 rj = 1, ri > 1. In this case N =Nr =Nr+ei ej +1.
( J )(r)  ( J )(r+ ei  ej) = (u  c)+ 
N
X
l:l6=j

max
m:m 6=l
J (r+ em  el)  max
m:m 6=l
J (r+ ei  ej + em  el)

Following the exact same line of argument as above, we have
( J )(r)  ( J )(r+ ei  ej) (u  c)+ 
N

(N   1)N

(u  c)

<
N

(u  c) :
 rj = 1, ri = 1. In this case we must have maxm:m6=lJ (r+ em  el) =maxm:m 6=lJ (r+ ei  ej + em  el) =
J (r+ ei   el), when l 6= i; j. And maxm:m 6=iJ (r+ em   ei) = J (r+ ej   ei) J (r) = maxm:m 6=iJ (r+ ei  
ej + em  ei). As a result, ( J )(r)  ( J )(r+ ei  ej) (u  c).
Now we focus on showing condition (7). Again, from the previous proof, we know that for J satisfying
(C1) and (C2), when rj > ri, we have J (r)  J (r + ei   ej), which implies the condition automatically.
Therefore we focus on cases when ri  rj . Also, note that in order for condition (6) to hold, we know that
no players can have 0 coupons.
 rj  2. In this case Nr =Nr+ei ej =N .
( J )(r)  ( J )(r+ ei  ej) = 
N
X
l

max
m:m6=l
J (r+ em  el)  max
m:m6=l
J (r+ ei  ej + em  el)

 
N
X
l

J (r+ em
l
  el) J
 
(r+ em
l
  el)+ ei  ej

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(1) There exists rk = 1. According to condition (6), all other players in Ir must have exactly ri scrip.
For any player l 6= k, r+ em
l
  el satises (6). Note that J (r+ ej   ek) = J (r+ ei  ek) since rj = ri. Thus
by choosing mk = j, we have
( J )(r)  ( J )(r+ ei  ej) 
N

(N   1)N

(u  c)

<
N

(u  c) :
(2) rl  2 for all l 2 Ir. By choosing ml 6= i when possible, r+ eml   el always satises condition (6),
which implies our result.
 rj = 1. Condition (6) implies that for all players l 2 Ir n j, rl = ri. Therefore, i achieves maxi:i 6=j J (r+
ei  ej), which has been shown earlier in the proof.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3: This result follows directly from the Folk Theorem for stochastic games (Theorem 9,
Dutta (1995)). In particular, we need to verify the following three conditions to invoke Theorem 9 in Dutta
(1995):
1. Unichain selection rule guarantees that the set of feasible long-run average payos is independent of
the starting state.
2. Each player's long-run average min-max payo needs to be independent of the starting state. Instead
of considering the min-max payo, we consider the \always refuse providing service" equilibrium strategy,
which generates 0 long run average payo, and therefore independent of the starting state.
3. The dimension of the set of feasible payos should be N . This condition holds because any single player
i can be ruled out from service, which creates a payo vector that has a constant positive value for all players
except player i, who has value zero. The resulting N vectors, each corresponding to one player being ruled
out, span <N .
Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 3: Start the value iteration algorithm (10)-(12) from V (r; j) dened as,
V (r;1) = u
r1 1X
k=0
 
N
k
; if r1  1 ; and V (r; j) = 0 ; otherwise.
Note that V  0 in general, and, in particular, V (r;1) u if r1  1.
Next we verify that T V  V  0.
1. When j = 1 and r1 = 0 we have,
(T V )(r;1) =

N
X
j0
V (r; j0) = 0= V (r;1) :
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2. When j = 1 and r1 > 0 we have,
(T V )(r;1) = u+

N j(r;1)j
X
j0
X
i2(r;1)
V (r  e1+ ei; j0) = u
r1 1X
k=0
 
N
k
= V (r;1) : (29)
3. When j 6= 1 and rj = 0 we have,
(T V )(r; j) =

N
X
j0
V (r; j0) 0 = V (r; j) :
4. When j 6= 1, rj > 0, and 1 62(r; j) we have,
(T V )(r; j) =

N j(r; j)j
X
j0
X
i2(r;j)
V (r  ej + ei; j0) 0 = V (r; j) :
5. When j 6= 1, rj > 0, and 12(r; j), following (29) we have, (T V )(r  ej + e1;1) u. Therefore,
(T V )(r; j) =
h
  c+ =N
X
i2(r;j)

V (r  ej + ei;1)+
X
j0 6=1
V (r  ej + ei; j0)
i
=j(r; j)j
=
h
  c+ =N
X
i2(r;j)
V (r  ej + ei;1)
i
=j(r; j)j

h
  c+(=N) V (r  ej + e1;1)
i
=j(r; j)j

h
  c+u=N
i
=j(r; j)j  0 = V (r; j) ;
in which the rst inequality is due to V  0, the second inequality due to (r  ej + e1)1  1 and therefore
V (r  ej + e1;1) u, and the last inequality from u=cN=.
Monotonicity and convergence of operator T imply that V  = limt!1 T t V  V  0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4: Consider a scrip distribution vector rn0n1n2 , where exactly n0 players have zero scrip, n1
players have 1 scrip, and n2 players have more than 1 scrip; therefore n0+n1+n2 =N . For n0  1, under the
minimum scrip selection rule, from state (rn0n1n2 ; j), the probability of transitioning into another state also
with n0 zero scrip players (including itself) is (n0+n1)=N (this happens when either a zero scrip player or
a one scrip player becomes the type 1 player, j). Otherwise, with probability n2=N , the system transitions
into a state with exactly n0   1 zero scrip players. For n0 = 0, the probability of transitioning into a state
with one zero scrip player is n1=N , and the probability of transitioning into a state where there are no zero
scrip players is n2=N . This implies that when n0  2 (and N  3), the system never transitions into state
(rn0n1n2 ; j) from another state with fewer number of zero scrip players. In addition, since RN , we must have
n2 > 0 when n0  1. That is, there is a positive probability when n0  1 that the system transitions out of
state (rn0n1n2 ; j) and into another state with one fewer zero scrip players. Starting from (r
N 1
01 ; j), where the
R scrips concentrate in one player, leaving the other N   1 players with 0 scrips, the above analysis implies
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that state (rN 101 ; j) must be transient. Decrease n0 one by one from N   2 to 2, and we have that state
(rn0n1n2 ; j) is transient as long as n0  2.
Note that for the special case when N = 2, it is impossible to have a state where more than one player has
0 scrips since the R 2 scrips must be held by at least one player. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5: We need to show that starting from any function V that satises (14), the condition
still holds after one step value iteration dened by the right hand side of recursive equations (10)-(12),
denoted as TV . For simplication of notation, we denote (r) =
P
j
V (r; j). We will show that every term
(TV )(r; j) corresponds to an equivalent term (TV )(r0; j^) for some j^ and vice versa, thus implying the result.
(1) j = 1. We show the equivalence of (TV )(r;1) with (TV )(r0;1) under the following two possibilities.
Note that if r1 = 0, then r
0
1 = 0.
(a) r1 = 0. By directly applying the induction hypothesis (14),
(TV )(r;1) =

N
(r) =

N
(r0) = (TV )(r0;1)
(b) r1 > 0.
(TV )(r;1) = u+

N j(r;1)j
X
i2(r;1)
(r  e1+ ei)
(TV )(r0;1) = u+

N j(r0;1)j
X
i2(r0;1)
(r0  e1+ ei)
For i 2(r;1) 6= l;m, note that i 2(r0;1) and (r  e1 + ei) = (r0   e1 + ei) by the induction hypothesis.
If l 2(r;1), then m2(r0;1) and (r  e1+ el) = (r0  e1+ em) by the induction hypothesis. Similarly, if
m 2(r;1), then l 2(r0;1) and (r  e1+ em) = (r0  e1+ el). Therefore, (TV )(r;1) = (TV )(r0;1) in this
case.
(2) j 6= l;m. We show the equivalence of (TV )(r; j) with (TV )(r0; j) under the following possibilities. Note
that if rj = 0, then r
0
j = 0. Also, if 1 62(r; j), then 1 62(r0; j).
(a) rj = 0. By directly applying the induction hypothesis (14),
(TV )(r; j) =

N
(r) =

N
(r0) = (TV )(r0; j)
(b) rj > 0 and 1 62(r; j).
(TV )(r; j) =

N j(r; j)j
X
i2(r;j)
(r  ej + ei)
(TV )(r0; j) =

N j(r0; j)j
X
i2(r0;j)
(r0  ej + ei)
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For i 2(r; j) 6= l;m, note that i 2(r0; j) and (r  ej + ei) = (r0   ej + ei) by the induction hypothesis.
If l 2(r; j), then m2(r0; j) and (r  ej + el) = (r0  ej + em) by the induction hypothesis. Similarly, if
m 2(r; j), then l 2(r0; j) and (r  ej + em) = (r0   ej + el). Therefore, (TV )(r; j) = (TV )(r0; j) in this
case.
(c) rj > 0 and 12(r; j).
(TV )(r; j) =
 c
j(r; j)j +

N j(r; j)j
X
i2(r;j)
(r  ej + ei)
(TV )(r0; j) =
 c
j(r0; j)j +

N j(r0; j)j
X
i2(r0;j)
(r0  ej + ei)
Similarly to the previous case, for i2(r; j) 6= l;m, note that i 2(r0; j) and (r  ej + ei) = (r0  ej + ei)
by the induction hypothesis. If l 2 (r; j), then m 2 (r0; j) and (r   ej + el) = (r0   ej + em) by the
induction hypothesis. Similarly, if m2(r; j), then l 2(r0; j) and (r ej+em) = (r0 ej+el). Therefore,
(TV )(r; j) = (TV )(r0; j) in this case.
(3) j = l. We show the equivalence of (TV )(r; l) with (TV )(r0;m) under the following possibilities. Note
that if rl = 0, then r
0
m = 0. Also, if 1 62(r; l), then 1 62(r0;m).
(a) rl = 0. By directly applying the induction hypothesis (14),
(TV )(r; l) =

N
(r) =

N
(r0) = (TV )(r0;m)
(b) rl > 0 and 1 62(r; l).
(TV )(r; l) =

N j(r; l)j
X
i2(r;l)
(r  el+ ei)
(TV )(r0;m) =

N j(r0;m)j
X
i2(r0;m)
(r0  em+ ei)
For i 2(r; l) 6=m, note that i 2(r0;m) and (r  el + ei) = (r0   em + ei) by the induction hypothesis.
If m 2(r; l), then l 2(r0;m) and (r  el+ em) = (r0  em+ el) by the induction hypothesis. Therefore,
(TV )(r; l) = (TV )(r0;m) in this case.
(c) rl > 0 and 12(r; l).
(TV )(r; l) =
 c
j(r; l)j +

N j(r; l)j
X
i2(r;l)
(r  el+ ei)
(TV )(r0;m) =
 c
j(r0;m)j +

N j(r0;m)j
X
i2(r0;m)
(r0  em+ ei)
Similarly to the previous case, for i 2(r; l) 6=m, note that i 2(r0;m) and (r  el+ ei) = (r0  em+ ei)
by the induction hypothesis. If m 2 (r; l), then l 2 (r0;m) and (r   el + em) = (r0   em + el) by the
induction hypothesis. Therefore, (TV )(r; l) = (TV )(r0;m) in this case.
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(4) j =m. This case is identical to case 3 above. Following the same logic with l and m interchanged, one
can show that (TV )(r;m) = (TV )(r0; l).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4
Obviously, constant 0 functions of the corresponding dimensions satisfy conditions (16)-(18). We just need
to show that starting from any functions V and V that satisfy (16)-(18), the condition still holds after
one step value iteration dened by the right hand side of equations (10)-(12), denoted as T V and TV ,
respectively.
First consider condition (16). That is, we show that if conditions (16), (17), and (18) hold for some
functions V and V , condition (16) also holds for TV and T V . For simplication of notation, we denote
(r) =
P
j
V (r; j), and  similarly, which will be used in the proof.
(1.1) j = 1, r1 = 0.
(TV )(r;1) = (=N)(r) (=N)(r+ ek) = (T V )(r+ ek;1) :
(1.2) j = 1, r1 > 0,
(TV )(r;1) = u+ =(N j(r;1)j)
X
i2(r;1)
(r  e1+ ei)
(T V )(r+ ek;1) = u+ =(N j(r+ ek;1)j)
X
i2(r+ek;1)
(r  e1+ ei+ ek) :
Consider the following 3 possibilities.
(i) (r+ek;1) =(r;1). In this case, V (r e1+ei+ek; j0) V (r e1+ei; j0) from induction hypothesis.
Therefore we have (T V )(r+ ek;1) (TV )(r;1).
(ii) (r+ ek;1)[fkg=(r;1). Following symmetry, we still have the result.
(iii) (r;1) = fkg. We have V (r  e1+ ek; j0) V (r  e1+ ei+ ek; j0) for any i 6= 1. Therefore,
(TV )(r;1) = u+ =N(r  e1+ ek)
 u+ =(N j(r+ ek;1)j)
X
i2(r+ek;1)
(r  e1+ ei+ ek) = (T V )(r+ ek;1) :
(2.1.1) j 6= 1, rj = 0, k 6= j,
(TV )(r; j) = (=N)(r) (=N)(r+ ek) = (T V )(r+ ek; j) :
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(2.1.2.1) j 6= 1, rj = 0, k= j, 1 62(r+ ej ; j)
(T V )(r+ ej ; j) = =(N j(r+ ej ; j)j)
X
i2(r+ej ;j)
(r+ ei)
 =(N j(r+ ej ; j)j)
X
i2(r+ej ;j)
(r) = (=N)(r) = (TV )(r; j) :
(2.1.2.2) j 6= 1, rj = 0, k= j, 12(r+ ej ; j). Lemma 4 implies that no more than one player has 0 scrips
in any state in the recurrent class. Therefore, we must have r1 > 0 and hence,
(T V )(r+ ej ; j) =
0@ c+ =N X
i2(r+ej ;j)
(r+ ei)
1A=j(r+ ej ; j)j
=
 c
j(r+ ej ; j)j +

N j(r+ ej ; j)j
0@ X
i2(r+ej ;j)n1
(r+ ei)+ (r+ e1)
1A
  cj(r+ ej ; j)j +

N j(r+ ej ; j)j
0@ X
i2(r+ej ;j)n1
(r+ ei)+ (r)+
cN

1A
  cj(r+ ej ; j)j +

N j(r+ ej ; j)j
0@ X
i2(r+ej ;j)n1
(r)+ (r)+
cN

1A
=
 c
j(r+ ej ; j)j +

N j(r+ ej ; j)j

j(r+ ej ; j)j(r)+ cN


=

N
(r) = (TV )(r; j)
where the rst inequality follows from (17), and the second inequality follows from (16).
(2.2.1) j 6= 1, rj > 0, 1 62(r; j), 1 62(r+ ek; j).
(TV )(r; j) = =(N j(r; j)j)
X
i2(r;j)
(r  ej + ei)
(T V )(r+ ek; j) = =(N j(r+ ek; j)j)
X
i2(r+ek;j)
(r  ej + ek+ ei) :
Following the 3 cases as in (1.2), we have the result.
(2.2.2) j 6= 1, rj > 0, 1 62 (r; j), 1 2 (r + ek; j). This means that we must have (r; j) = fkg, and
r1 = rk+1 (therefore r1 > 0).
(T V )(r+ ek; j) =
0@ c+ =N X
i2(r+ek;j)
(r  ej + ek+ ei)
1A=j(r+ ek; j)j
=
 c
j(r+ ek; j)j
+

N j(r+ ek; j)j
0@ X
i2(r+ek;j)n1
(r  ej + ek+ ei)+ (r  ej + ek+ e1)
1A
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  cj(r+ ek; j)j
+

N j(r+ ek; j)j
0@ X
i2(r+ek;j)n1
(r  ej + ek+ ei)+ (r  ej + ek)+ cN

1A
  cj(r+ ek; j)j
+

N j(r+ ek; j)j
0@ X
i2(r+ek;j)n1
(r  ej + ek)+ (r  ej + ek)+ cN

1A
=
 c
j(r+ ek; j)j +

N j(r+ ek; j)j

j(r+ ek; j)j(r  ej + ek)+ cN


=

N
(r  ej + ek) = (TV )(r; j) :
Here, the rst inequality follows from (17), the second inequality follows from (16), and the last equation
follows from the fact that (r; j) is a singleton with only one element, k.
(2.3.1) j 6= 1, rj > 0, 12(r; j), 12(r+ ek; j).
(TV )(r; j) =
0@ c+ =N X
i2(r;j)
(r  ej + ei)
1A=j(r; j)j
(T V )(r+ ek; j) =
0@ c+ =N X
i2(r+ek;j)
(r  ej + ek+ ei)
1A=j(r+ ek; j)j
Similar to case (1.2), we consider the three cases. When (r+ ek; j) = (r; j), we have the result directly
from condition (16). Since here we assume that 12(r; j), it is impossible that (r; j) = fkg.
Now we focus on the case where j(r + ek; j)j+ 1 = j(r; j)j = L > 1, that is, (r + ek; j) [ fkg = (r; j).
Since, by Lemma 4, no more than one player can have 0 scrips in any state in the recurrent class, we must
have r1 > 0.
L(L  1)  T V (r+ ek; j) T V (r; j)
= c+ 
N
24L
0@ X
i2(r+ek;j)n1
(r  ej + ek+ ei)+ (r  ej + ek+ e1)
1A
 (L  1)
0@ X
i2(r+ek;j)n1
(r  ej + ei)+ (r  ej + ek)+ (r  ej + e1)
1A35
= c+ 
N
h
(L  1)
X
i2(r+ek;j)n1

(r  ej + ei+ ek)  (r  ej + ei)

+
X
i2(r+ek;j)n1

(r  ej + ei+ ek)  (r  ej + ek)

  (r  ej + ek)
+(L  1)

(r  ej + ek+ e1)  (r  ej + e1)

+ (r  ej + ek+ e1)
i
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 c+ 
N
h
(r  ej + ek+ e1)  (r  ej + ek)
i
 c+ 
N
cN

= 0 ;
where the rst inequality follows (16), and the second inequality follows (17).
(2.3.2) j 6= 1, rj > 0, 12(r; j), 1 62(r+ ek; j). This is not possible when we assume k 6= 1.
Next, we consider condition (18) when r1 = 0. That is, we show that if (16) and (17) hold for some V and
V , condition (18) also holds for TV and T V . Since, by Lemma 4, no more than one player can have 0 scrips
in any state in the recurrent class, we know that player 1 is the only one with 0 scrips and hence,
X
j
TV (r; j) = c(N   1)+ 
N
 X
j 6=1
(r+ e1  ej)+ (r)
!
In this case
P
j
T V (r+ e1; j) has the following two possibilities.
R0.1 Player 1 remains the only minimum scrip holder in r + e1. There is a set L with jLj = l of other
players having the second least number of scrips.
X
j
T V (r+ e1; j) = u  c(N   1)+ 
N
 X
j 6=1
(r+2e1  ej)+ 1
l
X
i2L
(r+ ei)
!
Therefore, X
j
T V (r+ e1; j) 
X
j
TV (r; j) = u+

N
 
1
l
X
i2L

(r+ ei)  (r)

+
X
j 6=1

(r+2e1  ej)  (r+ e1  ej)
!
 u+ 
N
 X
j 6=1

(r+2e1  ej)  (r+ e1  ej)
!
 u+ 
N
cN

(N   1) = u+ c(N   1) N


N

  (N   1)

c ;
where the rst inequality follows induction hypothesis (16), the second inequality follows (17), and the last
inequality follows condition (15).
R0.2 Player 1 becomes a member of the set L, jLj= l, of minimum scrip holders in r+ e1.
X
j
T V (r+ e1; j) = u  c  N   l
l
c
+

N
0@X
j 62l
1
l
 X
i2Ln1
(r+ e1+ ei  ej)+ (r+2e1  ej)

+
X
j2Ln1
1
l  1
 X
i2Lnj;1
(r+ e1+ ei  ej)+ (r+2e1  ej)

+
1
l  1
X
i2Ln1
(r+ ei)
1A
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Therefore X
j
T V (r+ e1; j) 
X
j
TV (r; j) u+ c

(N   2)  N   l
l

+

N
 
1
l
X
j 62L

(r+2e1  ej)  (r+ e1  ej)

+
1
l  1
X
j2Ln1

(r+2e1  ej)  (r+ e1  ej)
1A
 u+ c

(N   2)  N   l
l

+

N

N   l
l
+1

cN

 N


N

  (N   1)

c ;
where the rst inequality follows induction hypothesis (16), the second inequality follows (17), and the last
inequality follows condition (15).
Now we consider condition (17) when r1 > 0. Following the denition of , we have the following cases forP
j
TV (r; j).
1. Player 1 is the only minimum scrip holder in both r and r+ e1. Let L, jLj= l, be the set of the second
least number of scrip holders.
X
j
T V (r+ e1; j) 
X
j
TV (r; j) =

N
 
1
l
X
i2L

(r+ ei)  (r  e1+ ei)

+
X
j 6=1

(r+2e1  ej)  (r+ e1  ej)
!
 
N

N


N

  (N   1)

+(N   1)N


c=
cN

;
where the inequality follows both (17) and (18). Note that if r1 > 1, using only (17) leads to the same
inequality, although not tight.
2. Player 1 is the only minimum scrip holder in r. Let L, jLj= l; be the set that includes player one plus
the l  1 others with exactly one more scrip (l > 1).
X
j
TV (r; j) = u  c(N   1)+ 
N
0@X
j 6=1
(r+ e1  ej)+ 1
l  1
X
i2Ln1
(r+ ei  e1)
1A
As a result, player 1 is one of l minimum scrip holders in r+ e1.
X
j
T V (r+ e1; j) = u  c  N   l
l
c
+

N
0@X
j 62L
1
l
 X
i2Ln1
(r+ e1+ ei  ej)+ (r+2e1  ej)

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+
X
j2Ln1
1
l  1
X
i2Lnj
(r+ e1+ ei  ej)+ 1
l  1
X
i2Ln1
(r+ ei)
1A
Therefore X
j
T V (r+ e1; j) 
X
j
TV (r; j) c

(N   2)  N   l
l

+

N
0@X
j 62L
1
l

(r+2e1  ej)  (r+ e1  ej)

+
1
l  1
X
i2Ln1

(r+ ei)  (r+ ei  e1)

+
1
l  1
X
j2Ln1

(r+2e1  ej)  (r+ e1  ej)
1A
 c

(N   2)  N   l
l

+

N

N   l
l
+1

cN

+

N
N


N

  (N   1)

c=
cN

:
where the rst inequality follows from (16), and the second inequality follows both (17) and (18). Similar to
before, if r1 > 1, we only need (17), which leads to the same inequality, although not tight.
3. Player 1 is in the set L, jLj= l 2 of players with minimum scrips.
X
j
TV (r; j) = u  c  N   l
l
c+

N
0@X
j 62L
1
l
 X
i2Ln1
(r+ ei  ej)+ (r+ e1  ej)

+
X
j2Ln1
1
l  1
 X
i2Lnfj;1g
(r+ ei  ej)+ (r+ e1  ej)

+
1
l  1
X
i2Ln1
(r+ ei  e1)
1A
(1) l= 2. Therefore in r+ e1 there is a unique minimum scrip holder, say player k. That is, L= f1; kg
and player 1 is among the set M , jM j=m, of second minimum scrip holders in r+ e1.
X
j
T V (r+ e1; j) = u  c
m
+

N
 X
j 62L
(r+ e1+ ek  ej)+ (r+ ek)
+
1
m
 X
i2Mn1
(r+ e1+ ei  ek)+ (r+2e1  ek)
1A
X
j
T V (r+ e1; j) 
X
j
TV (r; j)

1+
N   2
2
  1
m

c+

N
N


N

  (N   1)

c
+

N
cN


N   2
2
+
1
m

=
cN

;
where the inequality follows both (17) and (18). Again, if r1 > 1, it is ne using (17) only, which leads to a
more relaxed version of the same inequality.
(2) l > 2. Therefore there are l  1 minimum scrip holders in r+ e1.
X
j
T V (r+ e1; j) = u+

N
0@X
j 62L
1
l  1
X
i2Ln1
(r+ e1+ ei  ej)
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+
1
l  1
X
i2Ln1
(r+ ei) +
X
j2Ln1
1
l  2
X
i2Lnf1;jg
(r+ ei+ e1  ej)
1A
X
j
T V (r+ e1; j) 
X
j
TV (r; j)

1+
N   l
l

c
+

N
cN


N   l
l
(l  1)+ l  2

+

N
N


N

  (N   1)

c=
cN

4. There is a unique minimum scrip holder k 6= 1 with rk > 0, and player 1 is in the set L; jLj= l; of players
who have the second minimum scrips.
X
j
TV (r; j) = u  c
l
+

N
 X
j 6=k;1
(r+ ek  ej)+ (r+ ek  e1)
+
1
l
 X
i2Ln1
(r+ ei  ek)+ (r+ e1  ek)
1A
X
j
T V (r+ e1; j) = u+

N
 X
j 6=k;1
(r+ e1+ ek  ej)+ (r+ ek)
+
1
l  1
X
i2Ln1
(r+ e1+ ei  ek)
1A
X
j
T V (r+ e1; j) 
X
j
TV (r; j)

1
l
+(N   2)+ l  1
l

c+

N
N


N

  (N   1)

c=
cN

5. There is a unique minimum scrip holder k 6= 1 with rk > 0, and there are l players who have the second
minimum scrips, not including player 1. Following the same logic as before, we obtain
X
j
T V (r+ e1; j) 
X
j
TV (r; j) cN

6. There is a unique minimum scrip holder k 6= 1 with rk = 0.
X
j
T V (r+ e1; j) 
X
j
TV (r; j) cN

7. There are l 2 minimum scrip holders, not including Player 1.
X
j
T V (r+ e1; j) 
X
j
TV (r; j) cN

Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5
First we show the result for the general case where N  3. Denote 1 =
P
j
V (e; j), where e is the vector
of all ones; 2 =
P
j
V (e+ e1   e2; j), that is, player 1 has two scrips while another player has zero; 3 =P
j
V (e  e1+ e2; j), that is, player 1 has zero scrips while another player has two; 4 =
P
j
V (e+ e2  e3; j).
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Due to symmetry (see Lemma 5), (e; j), (e+ e1  e2; j), (e  e1+ e2; j), and (e+ e2  e3; j) for any j are the
only types of recurrent states in the system with R=N scrips. The corresponding recursive equations (10)
- (12) give us
1 = (u  c)+ (=N)
 
2+ 3+(N   2)4

; 2 = u+(=N)
 
1+(N   1)2

;
3 =  (N   1)c+(=N)
 
1+ 3+(N   2)4

; 4 = u+(=N)
 
1+ 3+(N   2)4

The solution is
1 =
(u  c)N
(1  )(N + )  0 ; 2 =

1  
N
(N   1)
 1  
N
1+u

 0 ;
3 =

1  
N
(N   1)
 1  
N
1+(N   1)c

(N   2)
N
  1

+
(N   2)
N
u

;
4 =

1  
N
(N   1)
 1  
N
1+
1
N

(N   )u  (N   1)c

 0 :
3  0 i
u
c


N +(N   1)(N   (N   2))(1  )(N + )



N +(N   2)(1  )(N + )
 = 1+ N


(N   1)  (N   2)

(1  )(N + )
N +(N   2)(1  )(N + )

=
N

0@

(N   1)(1  )(N + )+N


N +(N   2)(1  )(N + )

1A  (N   1) = N


1+
(1  )
N +(N   2)(1  )(N + )

  (N   1)
Under condition (20), the above inequality holds.
For the special case where N = 2 and following the same notation as above, the only types of recurrent
states are (e; j), (e+ e1  e2; j), and (e  e1+ e2; j) for j = 1;2. Thus we keep our denitions 1 =
P
j
V (e; j),
2 =
P
j
V (e+e1 e2; j), and 3 =
P
j
V (e e1+e2; j), and we no longer have 4 =
P
j
V (e+e2 e3; j) since
there are only two players. The corresponding recursive equations (10) - (12) give us
1 = u  c+ 
2
(2+ 3) ; 2 = u+

2
(1+ 2) ; 3 = c+ 
2
(1+ 3)
The solution is
1 =
 2(u  c)
(+2)(  1)  0 ; 2 =
 2(u2+ c  2u)
(+2)(  1)(  2) ; 3 =
2(c2+u  2c)
(+2)(  1)(  2)
2  0 i uc   2 2 , which is true under condition (20); 3  0 i uc  2 
2

, which is also true under
condition (20).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6
Obviously, constant 0 functions of the corresponding dimensions satisfy conditions (25)-(26). We just need
to show that starting from any functions V and V that satisfy (25)-(26), the condition still holds after
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one step value iteration dened by the right hand side of equations (22)-(23), denoted as T V and TV ,
respectively.
First consider condition (25). That is, we show that if conditions (25) and (26) hold for some functions V
and V , condition (25) also holds for TV and T V . For simplication of notation, we denote (r) =
P
j
V (r; j),
and  similarly, which will be used in the proof.
(1.1) j = 1, r1 = 0
(TV )(r;1) =

N
(r) 
N
(r+ ek) = (T V )(r+ ek;1)
(1.2) j = 1, r1 > 0
(TV )(r;1) = u+

N(N   1)
X
i6=1
(r  e1+ ei)
 u+ 
N(N   1)
X
i 6=1
(r  e1+ ei+ ek) = (T V )(r+ ek;1)
(2.1.1) j 6= 1, rj = 0, k 6= j
(TV )(r; j) =

N
(r) 
N
(r+ ek) = (T V )(r+ ek; j)
(2.1.2) j 6= 1, rj = 0, k= j
(T V )(r+ ej ; j) =
 c
N   1 +

N(N   1)
X
i 6=j
(r+ ei)
=
 c
N   1 +

N(N   1)
 X
i6=j;1
(r+ ei)+ (r+ e1)
!
  c
N   1 +

N(N   1)
 X
i 6=j;1
(r+ ei)+ (r)+
cN

!
  c
N   1 +

N(N   1)
 X
i6=j;1
(r)+ (r)+
cN

!
=
 c
N   1 +

N(N   1)

(N   1)(r)+ cN


=

N
(r) = (TV )(r; j)
where the rst inequality follows from (26), and the second inequality follows from (25).
(2.2) j 6= 1, rj > 0
(TV )(r; j) =
 c
N   1 +

N(N   1)
X
i 6=j
(r  ej + ei)
  c
N   1 +

N(N   1)
X
i 6=j
(r  ej + ei+ ek) = (T V )(r+ ek; j)
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Now we consider condition (26). That is, we show that if conditions (25) and (26) hold for some functions
V and V , condition (26) also holds for TV and T V . Following the denition of , we have the following two
cases. In each case, let l be the number of players that have 0 scrips other than player 1.
1. r1 > 0 X
j
T V (r+ e1; j) = u+

N(N   1)
X
i 6=1
(r+ ei)+
l
N
(r+ e1)
+(N   l  1)
 
 c
N   1 +

N(N   1)
X
i6=j
(r+ e1  ej + ei)
!
X
j
TV (r; j) = u+

N(N   1)
X
i6=1
(r  e1+ ei)+ l
N
(r)
+(N   l  1)
 
 c
N   1 +

N(N   1)
X
i6=j
(r  ej + ei)
!
X
j
T V (r+ e1; j) 
X
j
TV (r; j) =

N(N   1)
 X
i6=1
(r+ ei) 
X
i6=1
(r  e1+ ei)
!
+
l
N
((r+ e1)  (r))+ (N   l  1) 
N(N   1)
 X
i6=j
(r+ e1  ej + ei) 
X
i6=j
(r  ej + ei)
!
 
N(N   1)

cN(N   1)


+
l
N

cN


+(N   l  1) 
N(N   1)

cN(N   1)


= c+ lc+(N   l  1)c= cN  cN

where the rst inequality follows by the induction hypothesis.
2. r1 = 0 X
j
T V (r+ e1; j) = u+

N(N   1)
X
i 6=1
(r+ ei)+
l
N
(r+ e1)
+(N   l  1)
 
 c
N   1 +

N(N   1)
X
i6=j
(r+ e1  ej + ei)
!
X
j
TV (r; j) =

N
(r)+
l
N
(r)+ (N   l  1)
 
 c
N   1 +

N(N   1)
X
i6=j
(r  ej + ei)
!
X
j
T V (r+ e1; j) 
X
j
TV (r; j) = u+

N(N   1)
 X
i 6=1
(r+ ei)  (N   1)(r)
!
+
l
N
((r+ e1)  (r))+ (N   l  1) 
N(N   1)
 X
i6=j
(r+ e1  ej + ei) 
X
i6=j
(r  ej + ei)
!
 u+ 
N(N   1)
 X
i6=1
(r+ ei)  (N   1)(r)
!
+
l
N

cN


+(N   l  1) 
N(N   1)

cN(N   1)


 u+ lc+(N   l  1)c= u+(N   1)c cN

where the rst inequality follows by the induction hypothesis, the second inequality follows by (25), and the
last inequality follows by (24).
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Q.E.D.
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